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THE 'BAD BLOOD FACTOR' AND § 302
REDEMPTIONS: A RETROSPECTIVE EXAMINATION
AND ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Open hostility among family members who are also shareholders in a
closely held corporation can have a devastating effect on the health and pros-
perity of that corporation. Frequently, the best remedy, once reconciliation
proves impossible, is a rapid and complete withdrawal of one of the hostile
factions. The withdrawing party might sell his shares to an unrelated individ-
ual, but finding a ready buyer may be difficult. Fellow shareholders may be
unwilling or unable to purchase the available shares. Moreover, closely held
corporations are not given to welcoming unrelated, unknown, potential share-
holders. As a result, the only satisfactory means of terminating the interest is
often for the corporation to redeem the stock itself.
The taxpayer who receives money or other property from the redemption
of his stock will usually prefer to report the transaction to the Internal Reve-
nue Service as a sale or exchange so he can take advantage of capital gains
deductions attendant such a classification.1 But in order to qualify for the
favorable treatment, the redemption must not be "essentially equivalent to a
dividend," must be substantially disproportionate with respect to the share-
holder, or must result in a complete termination of the shareholder's interest
in the corporation. If the redemption does not meet one of these three condi-
tions, it will be treated as a distribution of property which is subject to taxa-
tion in full and at ordinary rates as a dividend.2 The shareholder who redeems
his stock because of "bad blood" between himself and related shareholders
may find that meeting these conditions is more difficult because of attribution
rules. These rules give him constructive ownership of stock directly owned by
those hostile, related shareholders and appear to be grounded on an assump-
tion of unity between related attributees 5 This note explores the varying suc-
cess taxpayers have achieved attempting to obtain recognition of the "bad
blood" factor in redemptions motivated by hostility. It presents the statutory,
legislative, and judicial history of the law in this area and critically analyzes its
current status.
I. ATTRmUTiON RULEs OF I.R.C. § 318
Any shareholder who seeks to terminate his interest in a corporation by
having the corporation redeem his stock must consider the effect of the attri-
bution rules of § 318 on his ownership status. Under those rules a person is
I See I.R.C. § 1202 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980). All references in the text and footnotes are to
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Code] as it appears in
26 U.S.C. (1976) unless otherwise noted.
2 See I.R.C. § 302 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980). See also infra, text accompanying notes 14-25.
3 See I.R.C. § 318 (1976). See also infra, text accompanying notes 4-13.
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considered to constructively own stock held by his spouse,' children, grandchil-
dren, and parents. 5 Similarly, stock actually owned by a partner, a beneficiary
of an estate,6 or a trust7 is considered to be constructively owned by the part-
nership, the estate, or the trust itself. The rules also attribute stock ownership
from shareholders to corporations if the shareholder owns fifty percent or more
in value of the stock.8 Attribution applies in both directions. For example,
stock owned by a partnership, corporation, trust or estate is owned construc-
tively and proportionately by its partners, shareholders, or beneficiaries.,
Once § 318 attributes stock from one person or entity to another, the In-
ternal Revenue Code provides for its reattribution in accordance with the rules
described above.10 For example, corporate stock owned by a trust might be
attributed to the trust's beneficiary and then attributed again to the benefi-
ciary's son. The result is that the son constructively owns corporate stock
through reattribution. Two limitations confine reattribution. Stock attributed
from one family member to another cannot be reattributed to a third family
member;" and stock attributed to a partnership, estate, trust, or corporation
by partners, beneficiaries, or shareholders cannot be reattributed from the en-
tities to other partners, beneficiaries, or shareholders.12
The attribution rules have been referred to as "horror stories"' s for share-
holders who wish to completely terminate their interests in a corporation. Al-
though the shareholder sells all the stock he owns directly, he cannot easily rid
himself of stock he owns constructively through attribution. The attribution
rules appear to be based on the assumption that individuals and entities which
are closely related will act in harmony with each other's interests. The effect
hostility between attributees has on this assumption and, hence, on construc-
tive ownership of stock is a key issue explored here.
II. STOCK REDEMPTIONS AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
A. Section 302
The Internal Revenue Code provides that "stock shall be treated as re-
deemed by a corporation if the corporation acquires its stock from a share-
holder in exchange for property .... -14 Once the Code classifies the transac-
tion as a redemption, § 302 determines how the redemption should be
reported.
4 I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(i) (1976).
I.R.C. § 318(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1976).
6 I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(A) (1976).
I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(B) (1976).
8 I.R.C. § 318(a)(3)(C) (1976).
9 I.R.C. § 318(a)(2)(A)-(C) (1976).
10 I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(A) (1976).
" I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(B) (1976).
2 I.R.C. § 318(a)(5)(C) (1976).
" Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1255 n.4 (5th Cir. 1979), reh. denied, 599 F.2d 1054
(1979).
.4 I.R.C. § 317(b) (1976). "Property" includes money. I.R.C. § 317(a) (1976).
[Vol. 85
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Section 302(a) provides that "such redemption shall be treated as a distri-
bution in part or full payment in exchange for the stock." Exchange treatment
qualifies the transaction for a possible capital gains deduction, a favorable
treatment since sixty percent of net capital gain can be deducted from ordi-
nary income.11 But exchange treatment is made available only if the redemp-
tion meets one of the conditions set out in §§ 302(b)(1), (2), and (3). If the
redemption does not meet one of these conditions, § 302(d) provides that the
distribution will receive less favorable treatment, possibly as a dividend. Divi-
dend treatment, outlined elsewhere in the Code, ' could result in ordinary in-
come which is taxable in full.
The first of the § 302 conditions, or "safe harbors," is that the redemption
must not be "essentially equivalent to a dividend."1 7 The second "safe harbor"
permits exchange treatment "if the distribution is substantially disproportion-
ate with respect to the shareholder."1 8 The assumption is that since dividends
are characteristically pro-rata distributions, a substantially disproportionate
distribution in a redemption is less likely to arise from dividend motivation.
The Code defines "substantially disproportionate" in terms of a comparison
between the percentage of voting stock the shareholder owns before the re-
demption and the percentage he owns after the redemption. In order to qualify
for exchange treatment, the stockholder, after the redemption has taken place,
must own less than eighty percent of the percentage of voting stock he owned
before the redemption. 9 This second safe harbor contains two limitations in
addition to the requirement of a substantially disproportionate distribution.
First, after the redemption, the shareholder must "own less than 50% of the
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote."20 Second,
the section denies exchange treatment to distributions which, though appar-
ently disproportionate when viewed separately, are made in pursuance of a
plan, the total effect of which results in a distribution which is not substan-
tially disproportionate." Redemptions which represent a complete termination
of the shareholder's interest in the corporation fall into the third safe harbor
and are given sale or exchange treatment.2 The Code also makes clear that the
test of dividend equivalency found in the first "safe harbor" rule will deter-
mine the issue, despite the failure of the redemption to meet the substantially
disproportionate redemption test or the termination of shareholder interest
test.
23
Whether a redemption falls under the protection of one of the "safe
" I.R.C. § 1202(a) (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
16 I.R.C. § 301 (1976).
" I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) (1976).
I8 I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (1976).
Is I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(C) (1976).
20 I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(B) (1976).
" I.R.C. § 302(b)(2)(D) (1976).
22 I.R.C. § 302(b)(3) (1976). A fourth safe harbor applied exclusively to redemptions of stock
issued by a railroad corporation under a plan of reorganization. I.R.C. § 302(b)(4) (1976). This
provision was eliminated by the Bankruptcy Act of 1980 and is not pertinent here.
23 I.R.C. § 302(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).
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harbors" depends both on the stock the shareholder owns directly and on the
shares he constructively owns under the attribution rules of § 318(a).2' But
forced constructive ownership of stock through the attribution process can be
costly to the taxpayer who, because of attribution, loses capital gains deduc-
tions. The burden occasioned by stock attribution when stock redemptions
arise out of family hostility forms the core of the family hostility problem.
B. History of the § 302 Conditions
Commentators agree that Eisner v. Macomber25 was probably the stimulus
for the language of the condition found in § 302(b)(1). 26 The Court held in
Eisner that dividends in the form of additional stock could not be taxed as
income to the taxpayer.27 The Court reasoned that, although gain derived from
capital was income, a stock dividend was essentially a transfer of an accumu-
lated surplus to the capital account of a corporation. The Court held a tax on
such a capital increase was void because the tax would run afoul of the six-
teenth amendment requirement that direct taxes be apportioned according to
the population.28
A loophole formed after the Eisner decision. A corporation might lessen
the tax impact of a proposed shareholder dividend by first issuing a stock divi-
dend, not taxable under Eisner, and then immediately redeeming the just is-
sued stock for cash. The shareholder would have all the original benefits of a
stock redemption, including exchange and capital gains treatment, even though
the purpose of the transaction was to put a cash dividend in his hands.
Congress enacted § 201(d) of the Revenue Act of 1921 to close the loop-
hole. It provided:
A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax but if after the distribution of any
such dividend the corporation proceeds to cancel or redeem its stock at such
time and in such manner as to make the distribution and cancellation or re-
demption essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the
amount received in redemption or cancellation of the stock shall be treated as
a taxable dividend to the extent of the earnings and profits accumulated by
such corporation after February 28, 1913. (emphasis added)29
Through judicial expansion, § 115(g) of the 1939 Code, which codified §
24 I.R.C. § 302(c)(1) (1976).
25 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
28 See, e.g., BITTKER & EusTIcE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLD-
ERS V 9.02 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BrrrKER & EusTICE].
27 252 U.S. at 219.
28 Id.
29 Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, 42 Stat. 228 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 115(g) (1939)).
I.R.C. 115(g) (1939) provided:
If a corporation cancels or redeems its stock (whether or not such stock was issued as a
stock dividend) at such a time and in such a manner as to make the distribution and
cancellation or redemption in whole or in part essentially equivalent to the distribution
of a taxable dividend, the amount so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the
stock, to the extent that it represents a distribution of earnings and profits accumulated
after February 28, 1913, shall be treated as a taxable dividend. (emphasis added)
(Vol. 85
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201(d), eventually came to mean that courts would view any pro-rata redemp-
tion with suspicion. The taxpayer would have the burden of showing that the
redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend but should instead be
treated as a sale or exchange.3 0
The actual determination of dividend equivalency was based on all the
material circumstances surrounding the redemption. In Boyle v. Commis-
sioner l the court noted several circumstances which led it to decide the divi-
dend equivalency question: (1) the redeeming corporation never paid cash divi-
dends, though it had accumulated a large, unnecessary surplus of cash; (2) no
evidence showed that the corporation was pursuing any policy of contraction or
liquidation; and (3) the initiative for the distribution came from the majority
shareholder.3 2
Cases such as Boyle clearly showed dividend equivalency to be a question
of fact. Courts would review a wide variety of circumstances to make that fac-
tual determination." In one case, for example, a court permitted a jury to
weigh evidence of family hostility. Certain family members wanted to avoid
having stock fall into the hands of another family member whose voice was not
welcomed in the corporation.3 4
Before the passage of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,35 Congress saw a
need to assist courts in making the determination of whether a stock redemp-
tion was essentially equivalent to a dividend. It added the more mechanical
safe harbor provisions found in §§ 302(b)(2), (3). When the House Ways and
Means Committee reported out the bill which included those mechanical con-
ditions,38 the Committee noted that prior to the 1954 Act considerable confu-
sion attended the determination of when a stock redemption would result in
capital gain and when it would result in ordinary income. The report indicated
that taxpayers had been "faced with potential dividend-tax liability in many
cases where such result [was] unwarranted, and in other cases [had] avoided
such liability where the redemption was the equivalent of a dividend. '37
The Committee reported further that the attribution rules, which resulted
in a shareholder owning stock held by his immediate family, were designed to
prevent tax evasion. The Committee wrote:
At the present time a possible opportunity for tax avoidance results when re-
30 See BrrrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 26.
31 187 F.2d 557, 560-61 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 817 (1951).
-1 See also, e.g., Comm'r v. Roberts, 203 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1953). (In Roberts the court re-
viewed the circumstances surrounding a redemption of shares bequeathed to the taxpayer by his
brother, the critical circumstance being that the taxpayer's relationship to the corporation was not
changed by the redemption. He continued as sole shareholder after the redemption.).
33 But see Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1957) (issue of essential equiv-
alence to a dividend found to be a question of law rather than one of fact). Cf. Metzger Trust v.
Comm'r, 76 T.C. 42 (1981), appeal filed, (August 14, 1981).
3' Jones v. Griffin, 216 F.2d 885, 890 (10th Cir. 1954).
"I Pub. L. No. 591-736, 68A Stat. 1.
36 See generally H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4017, 4058 (legislative history of the Act).
37 Id. at 4060.
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demptions are effected in the case of family-owned corporations. To prevent
tax avoidance, but at the same time to provide definitive rules for the guidance
of taxpayers, your committee has provided precise standards whereby under
specific circumstances, a shareholder may be considered as owning stock held
by members of his immediate family (or by partnerships, corporations, or
trusts which he controls). (emphasis added). 8
The bill reported out by the Committee 9 did not include the old § 115(g)
test of whether the redemption was essentially equivalent to a dividend.40 Ap-
parently, the members thought the test too broad and too difficult to apply as
evidenced by their recommendation of definitive rules and precise standards. A
superficial reliance on this report alone might lead the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice to ignore any collateral factors, which would blunt the precision with
which it could classify § 302 redemptions.41 However, when the Senate Finance
Committee reported the bill out, it reinserted the essence of the § 115(g) lan-
guage-language which remains today as § 302(b)(1). To the Senate Commit-
tee, the House provision "appeared unnecessarily restrictive, particularly in
the case of redemptions of preferred stock which might be called by the corpo-
ration without the shareholder having any control over when the redemption
took place."' 2
What appeared to be black and white in the Ways and Means Commit-
tee's approach suddenly appeared gray after the Senate Finance Committee
reported. The report gave its readers an example where the restrictive rules
would produce inequitable results. The example did not include family hostil-
ity but concerned a corporation which called its stock without the input of the
preferred shareholder.'3 Whether one may broadly interpret the report as
meaning, that § 302(b)(1) stands available as a palliative measure whenever
the mechanical rules do not produce equitable results, is arguable.
Congress may have intended, through the reinsertion of § 302(b)(1), to
give effect to the notion of flexibility, prompting a later court to comment:
"Complex as today's tax laws have become, we are convinced Congress in-
tended and desired enforcement proceedings to be accompanied by common
sense and basic principles of fairness."
Some evidence, at least, suggests the Senate Finance Committee intended
the results of the § 302(b)(1) test to take priority over whatever result was
obtained from application of the other tests in the section. It referred to the §
302(b)(1) "dividend equivalency test" as the "general rule," to be "supple-
mented" by the "substantially disproportionate" test. The inquiry, when ap-
38 Id. at 4061.
19 H.R. 8300, 83d CONG. REc., 2d Sess., (1954).
40 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
41 See Note, Family Hostility as a Factor in Determining Constructive Stock Ownership in
Corporate Redemptions, 29 TAx LAW. 386, 392-93 (1976).
42 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d CONG. REc., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4621, 4675.
43 Id.
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plying the "dividend equivalency" test, "will be devoted solely to the question
of whether or not the transaction by its nature may be properly characterized
as a sale of stock by the redeeming shareholder to the corporation."45
C. Treasury Regulation
The regulations the Treasury issued to implement § 302 and to offer
guidelines for its application give the courts significant discretion to decide
dividend equivalency despite the available mechanical tests. The regulations
state that the question of dividend equivalency for a redemption "depends on
the facts and circumstances of each case.'4 They also imply that a number of
facts should be considered in making the determination, only one of which is
attribution: "One of the facts to be considered in making this determination is
the constructive stock ownership of such shareholder under § 318(a)."'
III. THE EARLY RECOGNITION OF FAMILY HOSTILITY
Estate of Squier v. Commissioner" is the first case where the bad blood
factor was clearly recognized in the context of § 302 redemption of stock, and
it serves to illustrate the basic issue.
In this case, three individuals and a trust owned various proportions of a
small corporation. The principal shareholder, Squier, died, and a rift quickly
developed between his shareholder wife and the banker controlling her hus-
band's estate. Three years after Squier died, the estate redeemed a significant
portion of its shares. The purposes of the redemption were to raise money to
satisfy inheritance and federal estate tax liabilities, and to meet some of the
estate's outstanding debts.49 The redemption reduced the estate's proportion-
ate share of corporate ownership from 50.09% to 41.27% .0 Although, after the
transaction, the estated owned only 1,720 shares directly, its stock ownership
could increase to 2,368 shares if the attribution rules applied. Section 302(c)(1)
leads one to the conclusion that the rules should apply.51
The Tax Court, however, without even discussing attribution, agreed with
the estate that the entire redemption of stock should be given exchange treat-
ment. The court recognized the "sharp cleavage between the executor and
45 S. REP. No. 1622, supra note 42, at 4870-71. The sale of a withdrawing shareholder's stock
to the most readily available buyer, the corporation, when the shareholder needs to rapidly divest
himself of his holdings because of family discord seems to fall easily within the Committee's
inquiry.
16 Trees. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1956).
47 Id.
48 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq. 1961-2 C.B. 5, acq. withdrawn and nonacq. substituted, 1978-2
C.B. 5.
49 I.R.C. § 303 (1954) permits the redemption of shares to pay death taxes and funeral admin-
istration expenses. The transaction is treated like a sale and, therefore, qualifies for the favorable
capital gains treatment. In Squier, the money distributed in the redemption to cover debts of the
estate would not fall under the protection of the death taxes exception in the code.
50 35 T.C. at 950, 952.
51 I.R.C. § 302(c)(1) (1954) provides in pertinent part that the attribution rules "shall apply in
determining the ownership of stock for purposes of this section."
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members of the Squier family" which resulted in a "crucial reduction of the
estate's control over the corporation." 5' But the Tax Court did not decide the
issue on the sharp cleavage alone. It also gave weight to the existence of a
significant minority interest in the corporation: an interest not affected by at-
tribution.53 The minority interest prevented the estate from being considered
the sole owner of the corporation's outstanding shares. The Court distin-
guished its decision from its holding in Lewis, a case it decided the year
before.5' There, the court held the questioned redemption to be taxable as a
dividend, but, in that case, the estate would have been treated, after the appli-
cation of the attribution rules, as the sole owner of the outstanding stock of the
corporation. In Squier, the substantial minority interest prevented that result.
In any event, the critical factor for the court appeared to be how much actual
control the estate could exercise after the redemption of its shares, not how
much presumed control the estate could exercise after a mechanical attribution
of stock ownership.
The Tax Court soon decided another case under the Squier reasoning.
Parker v. Commissioner concerned a redemption that shifted control of a cor-
poration from father to son.55 The father and son severely disagreed over the
management of the company, and they saw the shift in control as a way of
resolving the problem. Although after the redemption the father maintained
control of the corporation on paper through constructive ownership of his son's
stock, the court was persuaded by the total factual picture that the redemption
of stock was not equivalent to a dividend.56
Parker is significant in that the court permitted exchange treatment even
absent the substantial, unrelated minority interest as found in Squier. Al-
though the court conceded the absence of such an interest weakened the case
as compared with Squier, the "sharp and continuing disagreement" between
Parker and his son sufficed to negate control.57 The bad blood factor had
gained ground.
The flexible interpretation the Tax Court accorded § 302(b)(1) in Squier
and Parker did not provoke taxpayers to rush to the courts claiming that fam-
ily hostility motivated their stock redemptions. Case reports did show that div-
idend equivalency was being decided on a case by case basis,"8 but none of
these decisions concerned the effect of family hostility on redemptions as a
central issue until Haft Trust v. Commissioner was decided in 1973. 5,
82 35 T.C. at 955-56 (emphasis in original).
3 Id. at 956.
Lewis v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 71 (1960) (There were no hostile interests or adversity of interests
among the various shareholders in this case.).
20 T.C.M. (CCH) 893 (1961).
' Id. at 901.
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Bains v. United States, 289 F.2d 644, 646 (1961) (decided "on basis of the particu-
lar facts in question").
" Haft Trust v. Comm'r, 61 T.C. 398 (1973), supplemental opinion, 62 T.C. 145 (1974), va-
cated and remanded, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975). See infra text accompanying notes 70-79.
[Vol. 85
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Another court showed its receptivity to the bad blood factor in Bradbury
v. Commissioner, although family hostility was not the issue in the case. 0 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals remarked that "[w]hile [the] attribution rules
are generally applicable to § 302(b)(1) . . . their imposition is not inflexible
and if it can be demonstrated that discord exists in a family relationship which
would make attribution unwarranted, they will not be applied."61 While the
law emerging from the case-by-case approach seemed flexible enough to admit
bad blood as a factor to be considered, that very flexibility was proving troub-
lesome to some courts. The Fourth Circuit, with evident exasperation, in one
case referred to the "morass created by the decisions." 6
IV. Davis PROVOKES A RECONSIDERATION
The Supreme Court decided United States v. Davis in 1970. This impor-
tant case precipitated a change in the thinking of both the Tax Court and the
Internal Revenue Service with regard to the ability of § 302(b)(1) to embrace
the bad blood factor. Davis contained elements which would seemingly support
both sides of the question. Though the facts do not evidence family hostility,
the holding of the case is important to the validity of mechanically applying
the attribution rules, however harsh their ultimate result.
Four members of the Maclin P. Davis family owned the corporation at the
time of the redemption. Davis himself owned 250 shares of common stock, as
did his wife, his son, and his daughter. Shortly after the corporation was
formed, Davis received 1,000 shares of preferred stock in return for an addi-
tional $25,000 investment. The additional investment was a necessary addition
to capital required for the corporation to qualify for a loan. The directors
agreed from the start that after the loan was repaid the corporation would
redeem Davis' 1,000 shares of preferred stock, returning to him the precise
amount of his additional investment. The corporation repaid the loan, re-
deemed the shares, and Davis reported the $25,000 he received in the redemp-
tion as having been received from a sale or exchange. By Davis' reckoning, he
had no income to report since he realized no gain from the redemption, his
basis in the stock also being $25,000. The Internal Revenue Service argued, on
the other hand, that the redemption of Davis' preferred stock was essentially
equivalent to a dividend within the meaning of § 302(b)(1) and should, there-
fore, be treated as a dividend under §§ 301 and 316."
The Supreme Court approved the dividend treatment. According to the
Court, the attribution rules were to be applied to all of § 302, including the
determination of dividend equivalence in § 302(b)(1).6 ' Attribution in this case
rendered Davis a sole shareholder before and after the redemption. The Court
,0 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962).
I' Id. at 116 n.7.
82 Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1962).
397 U.S. 301, reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 1071 (1970).
" I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (1954) provides that a distribution by a corporation with respect to its
stock which is a dividend shall be included in gross income. I.R.C. § 316 defines "dividend".
41 Davis, 397 U.S. at 306.
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considered him, as a sole shareholder, to have simply redeemed a portion of his
stock and held that "such a redemption is always 'essentially equivalent to a
dividend.' "6"
The Court decided that whether the corporation had a valid business pur-
pose for making the redemption was an irrelevant issue in the determination of
dividend equivalence.6 7 The Court held that "to qualify for preferential treat-
ment [under § 302(b)(1)], a redemption must result in a meaningful reduction
of the shareholder's proportionate interest in the corporation" after the appli-
cation of the attribution rules.6 8 The statement appeared flexible enough to
support the assertion that even after attribution, if family hostility results in a
"meaningful reduction" of interest in the corporation, exchange treatment
could follow. The Second Circuit defined interest in the corporation as includ-
ing the right to vote and "thereby exercise control."69 Davis was not dispositive
of whether family hostility could soften the application of the attribution rules
because the issue was not presented there.
When the issue of family hostility and the effect of the attribution rules
did finally arise again before the Tax Court in Haft Trust v. Commissioner, the
majority interpreted Davis as rejecting the rationale on which the Squier case
was decided.70 On facts fraught with family hostility, the court decided not to
give consideration to the bad blood factor. The taxpayer appealed the determi-
nation to the First Circuit which vacated the Tax Court's decision.
The Tax Court had held that the plain language of § 302 made the attri-
bution rules apply. Furthermore, it claimed recognition of family hostility
would frustrate legislative objectives and be inconsistent with Davis.7 1 In va-
cating the Tax Court decision, the First Circuit relied on Squier for the pro-
position that "family discord could belie the community of interest rationale of
the attribution rules. '72 That court construed Davis as not requiring that the
factual inquiry end after taking into account the attribution rules7" and further
supported its position by pointing to the regulations' implication that attribu-
tion is only one factor to be considered in making determinations of dividend
equivalency.7 4
Emphasizing the congressional reinsertion of the "essentially equivalent"
language in § 302(b)(1), the court concluded:
86 Id. at 307.
17 Id. at 312. See also Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811, 814 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 834 (1965). The business purpose deemed irrelevant was that of utilizing the corporation's
high credit rating in order to indirectly obtain a loan for another corporation.
8 Davis, 397 U.S. at 313.
9 Himmel v. Comm'r, 338 F.2d 815, 817 (2d Cir. 1964). The taxpayer would seem free to
argue that because of family hostility he had no control despite the presumed "attribution" of
control through the operation of § 318.
70 Haft Trust, 61 T.C. at 403.
71 Id.
72 Haft Trust, 510 F.2d at 46.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss1/10
BAD BLOOD FACTOR
[TIhough a wooden subjugation to the attribution rules might have adminis-
trative advantages it could also work injustice in particular cases, and we think
that in retaining this section [302(b)(1)] in the Code alongside the safe harbor
rules, Congress showed itself willing to tolerate some administrative inconve-
nience for the sake of taxpayer equity.75
Not finding enough information in the record to make its own decision on the
full effects of family hostility in this particular instance, the court remanded
the case. However, a subsequent settlement obviated the necessity for another
Tax Court review.76
V. RESPONSES TO Davis AND Haft
The Internal Revenue Service was not impressed with the First Circuit's
reasoning. The Commissioner considered facts similar to those found in Haft
in a revenue ruling and declared that the Service would not follow the First
Circuit's decision.77 He weighed the easily applied objective standards for stock
attribution and determination of control with what he regarded as "the confu-
sion of prior law" and opted in favor of the former.7 8 In 1978 the Service with-
drew its acquiescence to the Tax Court's flexible approach in Squier.7
Some commentators suggest that in its revenue ruling the Service was
bucking the rising tide of jurisdictions which favored the recognition of bad
blood as a mitigator of the effects of the attribution rules.8 0 Those jurisdictions
included both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits which seemed to lean toward the
First in potentially recognizing the bad blood factor. The cases considered by
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits did not deal with the same family hostility fac-
tual pattern, but the tilt towards the First Circuit's approach is observable.
In the Eighth Circuit case of Wright v. United States,81 Judge Bright hy-
pothesized that had the case involved shares attributed to the taxpayer
through shareholders "with interests adverse to the taxpayer" then the Squier
case would be applicable, i.e., family hostility would be considered in determin-
ing dividend equivalency.82
The Ninth Circuit case, Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. United States,8 3
"I Id. at 48.
76 See, Note, Family Hostility as a Factor in Determining Constructive Stock Ownership,
supra note 58, at 392.
77 Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B. 66, ("The facts and circumstances of a particular case cannot
contradict the mechanical determination under section 318 of how much stock a shareholder
owns." Id. at 67.).
78 Id.
71 1978-2 C.B. 5.
So See, e.g., O'Dell & Boyd, Family Hostility and Stock Redemption: RR 80-26 Revives the
Controversy, 59 TAXES 153 (1981). See also Swennes, "Not essentially equivalent to a dividend"
Exception Still Viable Despite Davis, 41 J. TAX'N 78 (1974). Courts since Davis have taken a
"pragmatic approach to the meaningful reduction issue and have eschewed adopting any formal-
ized test." Id. at 83.
81 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973) (Bright, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 612.
83 484 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1973).
1982]
11
Miller: The Bad Blood Factor and 302 Redemptions: A Retrospective Examina
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
concerned facts similar to Haft and Rev. Rul. 80-26, except that the essential
family hostility ingredient was lacking. Husband and wife, sole owners of a
corporation, had created three trusts, one for each of their three children, to
share in the corporate ownership. For what they considered to be valid busi-
ness reasons (not hostility related), the husband and wife caused the corpora-
tion to completely redeem the stock owned by the trusts. Despite the complete
termination of actual interest caused by the redemption, the court still consid-
ered each trust to be a 100% shareholder because of attribution from the par-
ents by way of the children. The distribution was held to be essentially
equivalent to a dividend, but the court, referring to the assumption of unity
and entity in a family, said, "[s]uch assumptions may, indeed, prove awkward
or unfair in cases where families do not behave as the rules assume they will,
and intra-family disputes exist as to who should control and how.
8 4
The Fifth Circuit also appears to stand ready to broaden the recognition
given to the effects of bad blood. The court in Rickey v. United Statess s did
not construe § 302(b)(1), yet it seemed to nod approval to the First Circuit's
decision in Haft to follow Squier. "It can be argued that Squier was overruled
sub silentio by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis....
We do not agree with that interpretation as Davis involved no claim of family
hostility."' How the Fifth Circuit dealt with Rickey is especially important
because the most recent case involving family hostility has been appealed to
that forum.87
The Tax Court has shown some ambivalence in recognizing family hostil-
ity in the § 302(b)(1) dividend equivalency determination. On the one hand, in
a note to Deyoe v. Commissioner, the Tax Court referred to the words "essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend" and opined that they were words "which Con-
gress clearly intended to receive judicial elaboration."88 In a 1979 case, the Tax
Court did not summarily dismiss the taxpayer's claim of family hostility but
reviewed the facts closely, taking into consideration evidence of friendly rela-
tions between -the pertinent individuals.8 The court did not find hostility on
the facts of the case, but at least showed a willingness to consider the factor.90
In an earlier case, the Tax Court emphasized the full applicability of the ef-
fects of attribution in every case as a means of "remov[ing] the uncertainties
existing under prior law." 1 Control of the corporation was determined "not-
withstanding any 'bad blood'."9 2 But even in this case the Tax Court reviewed
the facts closely enough to disagree with the taxpayer about the existence of
84 Id. at 465 n.4.
85 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979).
86 Id. at 1257 n.6.
87 See Metzger Trust v. Comm'r, 76 T.C. 42 (1981), appeal filed, Aug. 14, 1981.
88 66 T.C. 904, 915 n.6 (1976).
89 Johnson Trust v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 941, 946 (1979).
80 The Johnson court nevertheless found the attribution rules inapplicable because the re-
demption was complete, and the redeemed trust filed the requisite § 302(c)(2)(iii) waiver agree-
ment. Id. at 955.
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bad blood as an inference from "disagreement. 93 Despite the Tax Court's am-
bivalence on the weight to be given family hostility, it has always stood firm in
holding that the attribution rules should at least be applied."
VI. WAIVER OF ATTRIBUTION: THE ALTERNATE SOLUTION
This note has considered the effects of bad blood only on the dividend
equivalency test of § 302(b)(1) up to this point. Congress did provide a rela-
tively simple means of waving attribution rules where there is a complete re-
demption of interest. The method is outlined in § 302(c)(2).
Section 302(c)(2) waives the family attribution rules for the redeemed
shareholder if (1) immediately after the distribution the distributee has no ac-
tual interest in the corporation other than interest as a creditor;95 (2) the dis-
tributee does not acquire any such interest within ten years from the date of
the distribution (unless by bequest or inheritance);96 and (3) the distributee
files an agreement to notify the Internal Revenue Service upon attaining any
such interest.9 7
One may quickly perceive the potential applicability of this section to
cases where family hostility motivates a redemption of stock. If family mem-
bers wish to sever their business and personal relationships, complete redemp-
tion will achieve that goal without unfavorable tax consequences as long as the
taxpayer meets the requirements and files the agreement. It is an apparently
simple solution to the hostility question. The problem arises in cases such as
Haft and Squier where the redeemed shareholder is not an individual family
member but is a trust or an estate. The language of § 302(c)(2) refers specifi-
cally to § 318(a)(1) family attribution, and would not seem to apply to fatal
attribution between beneficiaries and their corresponding trusts or estates.
Thus, one might take the position that only an individual may waive family
attribution.
In the case of trusts or estates, expanding the reading of § 302(c)(2)(A) to
include attribution between entities and individuals is an alternative to recog-
nizing bad blood in the dividend equivalency determination of § 302(b)(1).
That alternative was embraced in the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rickey v.
United States"8 and to some extent by the Tax Court's decision in Estate of
Crawford v. Commissioner," a case which preceded Rickey.
The reason for the complete termination of interest in Rickey was the
death of the principal shareholder. The executor of his estate filed the agree-
,3 Id. at 284.
" See Fehrs Finance Co. v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 174 (1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974); Grabowski Trust v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 650 (1972); Sawelson v.
Comm'r, 61 T.C. 109 (1973).
I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i) (1976).
. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(ii) (1976).
I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) (1976).
98 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979).
" 59 T.C. 830 (1973), nonacq., 1974-2 C.B. 5. The Commissioner reasserted his rejection of
Estate of Crawford. See Rev. Rul. 79-67, 1979-1 C.B. 128.
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ment provided for in § 302(c)(2)(A)(iii) and contended that it was effective to
waive the entity-beneficiary attribution rules. The Fifth Circuit agreed, ex-
panding § 302(c)(2) to include Rickey's estate.
If the motivation for the complete termination of interest had been family
hostility, one wonders if the court would have taken so liberal a position. Per-
haps the exigencies of the facts of this case restrict application of its principles.
The court, perhaps indicating impatience with such a wooden application of
law, explained, "[w]e will not find that the decedent's death was a device to
bleed out corporate profits at capital gains rates." 00
Before Rickey, the Tax Court indicated its intention to avoid a "slavish"
application of a statute's literal language where the application would lead to
"absurd consequences."101 In Crawford two corporations redeemed the shares
of the estate of Walter Crawford which he had held as community property
with Lillian, his wife. The redemption would have completely terminated the
estate's interest in the corporation but for its constructive ownership of stock
through Lillian's two sons who also owned shares. Both Lillian Crawford and
the estate filed § 302(c)(2) waivers purporting to avoid attribution. Construc-
tive stock ownership would have prevented them from benefiting from what
would have otherwise been a § 302(b)(3) complete termination of interest. The
Commissioner argued that no agreement the estate filed could prevent attribu-
tion to it. Foreshadowing his later argument in Rickey, he claimed the estate
was an entity, and the only attribution waived by such an agreement was fam-
ily attribution. The Commissioner also argued that Lillian Crawford could not
file the agreement needed to waive attribution because she was not the actual
"distributee" according to a liberal interpretation of the Code. Nevertheless,
the Tax Court held that the waiver agreement filed by the estate effectively
waived attribution to it.' 02 The Tax Court, by reaching equity through alter-
nate means, did not need to consider the taxpayer's argument that the re-
demption would qualify as a redemption under § 302(b)(1).10 3
VII. THE TAX COURT'S LATEST POSITION: Metzger
Metzger Trust v. Commissioner'04 stands out from the other cases in the
area because, although family hostility was the motivating factor for the re-
demption, no hostility existed between any of the attributees. The hostility
100 Rickey, 592 F.2d at 1258. It is interesting to note here that certain portions of Rickey were
overruled by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982. That Act permits family attri-
bution to be waived by an entity and its beneficiaries. As the authors of the Conference Report
point out: "The waiver rules would not be extended to waivers of attribution to and from entities
and their beneficiaries. . . .The bill thus is intended to overrule Rickey. "H.R. REP. No. 97-
760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 545 (1982).
10, Estate of Crawford, 59 T.C. at 836. See also International Trading Co. v. Comm'r, 57 T.C.
455, 461 (1971). ("[Wie do not believe that strict construction requires a slavish unreasoning ad-
herence to the literal reading of the statute.").
102 Estate of Crawford, 59 T.C. at 837.
103 In Johnson Trust v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 941 (1979), the Tax Court extended the same expan-
sive courtesy to trusts.
104 76 TAX CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 76.3.
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was confined to siblings where no attribution takes place. The Tax Court, in
this case, sets out its current position on the bad blood factor as it affects §
302(b)(1) dividend equivalency. It also takes a firm position on further expan-
sion of § 302(c)(2) and, therefore, on whether taxpayer trusts can make benefi-
cial use of waiver agreements in the face of a redemption motivated by bad
blood, as well.
On the issue of dividend equivalency, the Tax Court relied mainly on what
it considered to be a clear statutory mandate for the proposition that the attri-
bution rules should apply to dividend equivalency determinations under
§302(b)(1). "It is not the function of a Court to rewrite or amend a statute in
the guise of construing it,"'10 5 and if it had so desired, "Congress might have
added a greater family fight exception to the attribution rules than it did."' '
While the court recognized a limited role for the bad blood factor in a §
302(b)(1) determination, the factor would become relevant only after the attri-
bution rules were applied. However, even then, family hostility would not be
considered if attribution left a shareholder with 100% ownership after the
transaction. Following Davis, the court found such a redemption could never
result in a meaningful reduction of shareholder interest, family hostility or not,
because one of the facts to be considered in making this determination (of
dividend equivalency) is the constructive stock ownership.10 7 The court rea-
soned that permitting redemption from a sole shareholder to result in a mean-
ingful reduction of interest "ignores the constructively owned stock ... con-
trary to the statute, regulations, the legislative history and the rule of
Davis."08
Although the court recognized its decision created a harsh result,'09 the
fact that the trust was, after strict application of the attribution rules, the sole
shareholder both before and after the redemption, controlled its conclusion
that no meaningful reduction of interest occurred.
The taxpayer relied on Rickey for the proposition that the trust could
waive the attribution rules by complying with the requirements of §
302(c)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii). But the Tax Court, placing high value on judicial re-
straint, would not rely on Rickey and its' rejection of a "crabbed reading" of
the Code. 110 It summarily distinguished the prior case on the fact that the re-
demption there was necessitated by the death of a shareholder.
The Tax Court did not speak with one voice in Metzger. Judge Tannen-
wald did not support the majority's having even considered the issue of family
hostility as a mitigator of the attribution rules. He pointed out that no hostil-
ity existed between attributees. Jacob Metzger was trustee of the Metzger
trust. The fatal attribution was from Jacob to the trust. As Judge Tannenwald
101 76 TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 1 76.3, at 31.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 32.
103 Id. at 33.
109 Id. at 34.
110 See Rickey, 592 F.2d at 1258.
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points out, "it seems obvious that Jacob could not be hostile to himself." '
Judge Tannenwald and the four other Tax Court judges who concurred with
him also disagreed with how the majority limited recognition of family discord.
It had restricted recognition of the factor to "cases in which the taxpayer's
actual and constructive ownership after the redemption is less than his actual
and constructive ownership before the redemption... ." Judge Tannenwald
claimed that such a stance "paves a road for objectionably arbitrary results."'' 12
By his reckoning, when the legal fiction of attribution is refuted by family dis-
cord, the amount of the attribution is irrelevant. The family hostility issue re-
mains unsettled.
VIII. CRITIcAL ANALYSIS
Taxpayers have sought relief from the assumption that they would act in
concert with related persons and entities when in reality they shared nothing
but a common desire to sever all contact. They have attempted to expand the
interpretation of the language of § 302(c)(2) so that relief could follow the rec-
ognition of their waiver agreements. Most recently the taxpayer has offered
family hostility to avoid dividend treatment even when the hostility did not
involve § 318 attributees. They have had varying success.
The three routes taxpayers have taken to seek relief from what they con-
sidered harsh treatment show that the family hostility question is broader than
the existence of a bad blood exception to the attribution rules. The question
includes how family hostility affects the whole of § 302: the application of the
attribution rules, dividend equivalency determination apart from attribution,
and the waiver rules in § 302(c)(2). Taxpayers have used all three approaches.
Disregarding the attribution rules altogether appears unjustified. Even
though a position that the basis for the § 318 rules always accords with reality
is untenable, the Code is clear on the matter and unequivocally states "section
318(a) shall apply in determining the ownership of stock for purposes of this
section."'1 3
The value of giving effect to the attribution rules' application in all cir-
cumstances is increased efficiency and predictability for the tax planner. 1 4 The
burden of actually defining and measuring the level of harmony between re-
lated parties in every case may well be impossible, or at least unbearable." 5 On
the other hand, most would agree that dealings between those related by blood
are often not at arm's length."1 The language of § 302(b)(1) does appear flex-
111 Id. at 44.
112 Id.
113 I.R.C. § 302(c)(1) (1976).
11 See Coyle v. United States, 415 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1968).
"' See Surrey, Income Tax Problems of Corporations and Shareholders: American Law In-
stitute Tax Project - American Bar Association Committee on Legislative Revision, 14 TAx L.
REv. 1, 51 (1958). "[T]he burden on tax administration and tax planning would be almost intolera-
ble if these assumptions were treated only as presumptions, with the final issue depending on the
particular factual situation."
"' See, e.g., Ringel, Surrey, & Warren, Attribution of Stock Ownership in the Internal Reve-
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ible enough to admit consideration of the effects of clearly discernable family
hostility when that factor motivates a redemption of stock. If the hostility is at
a level high enough to prompt withdrawal from a profitable enterprise in order
to sever personal relationship, it is probably high enough to be readily
confirmed.
The presence of § 302(b)(1) in the Code can quite possibly obviate any
need to ignore the attribution rules when there is bad blood between at-
tributees. Though the attribution rules still apply, having whatever effect they
will on "constructive ownership" does not necessarily result in actual control.
The test under § 302(b)(1) considers the extent of that actual control, and
consequently, whether the redemption resulted in a meaningful reduction of
interest.
The rationale of Squier"1 and Haft28 remains valid, but that stance does
not necessarily have to run afoul of the Court's holding in Davis."9 Davis ne-
gated the relevancy of a valid corporate business purpose when determining
whether a distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend. 20 But when sug-
gesting the irrelevance of the presence or absence of a tax avoidance motive,
the Court still appeared to be thinking in terms of what is good for the busi-
ness. To be sure, the withdrawal of one faction in a hostile family is likely to be
good for the business. But it may be a relatively simple matter for the tax-
payer, a shareholder in a closely held corporation, to show that no business
purpose at all was relevant when he agreed to the redemption of his or another
family member's stock. He may, instead, be able to show clearly that his sole
motivation, and that of his family, was personal, neither business nor tax ori-
ented at all, and the kind of motivation that would produce action even in the
face of a tax penalty.
Though some commentators have been reluctant to recognize that Con-
gress intended to give the liberal construction to § 302(b)(1) necessary to allow
recognition of family hostility,21 "the intended scope of [the section] as re-
vealed by [the] legislative history is certainly not free from doubt.' 22 Given
congressional intent to avoid "unnecessarily restrictive" legislation, 23 one
could just as confidently support the notion that a liberal reading is called for.
The flexibility of § 302(b)(1) should not be defeated simply because fortui-
tous circumstances and the effects of attribution result in an individual's being
a 100% shareholder both before and after the redemption. Judge Tannen-
nue Code, 72 HARV. L. REV. 209 (1958). The "rules of constructive ownership rest on certain as-
sumptions which are readily supportable in the everyday conduct of affairs."
117 Estate of Squier v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 950 (1961), acq. withdrawn and nonacq. substituted,
1978-2 C.B. 5.
"' Haft Trust v. Comm'r, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975).
'19 United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
120 There is some potential support for reinstating the business purpose rule under I.R.C. §
302(b)(1). See, e.g., Albers v. Comm'r, 414 U.S. 982, 988 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari, joined by Douglas and Blackmun, JJ. The opinion protests the severity of Davis.).
:2 See Bir'KER & EUSTICE, supra note 26, at 9.24.
22 Davis, 397 U.S. at 311.
123 Supra note 42.
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wald's concurrence in Metzger exposes the "objectionably arbitrary results"
that can result from maintaining that position. 12 4 As Judge Tannenwald sug-
gests, "whether or not a third party owns a minimal amount of stock has noth-
ing whatsoever to do with the issue. '125
The third alternative for dealing with redemptions caused by family hos-
tility, expanding the reading of § 302(c), seems to have no valid justification. A
broad reading of the § 302(b)(1) language and its supporting legislative history
achieves the desired goal. Arriving at the same destination by what amounts to
judicial amendment of legislation is unsatisfactory. Although it is the function
of a court to construe statutes, it is not its function to amend.1 26 Congress pro-
vided an uncomplicated method of retiring the interests of shareholders in §
302(c)(2). The method is especially useful when bad blood causes complete ter-
mination of a family member's interest. Admittedly, it is difficult to believe
Congress could have intended to make that method unavailable when the
shares happen to be owned by an estate or trust, or the fatal attribution in-
volves one of these entities. Nevertheless, one can find no provision in the stat-
ute to waive attribution between those entities. The Internal Revenue Code
limits the waiver to attribution between family members. If Congress erred in
the omission, it is Congress' responsibility to make the correction, not the re-
sponsibility of the courts. Until it does, a liberal reading of § 302(b)(1) is suffi-
cient to handle the problem..
2 7
Congress has indirectly recognized family hostility, division of interest,
and communication breakdowns in other parts of the Internal Revenue Code.
For example, the presumption that spouses are of one mind in reporting in-
come in a joint tax return can be rebutted under § 6013(e). If one spouse estab-
lishes that in signing the joint tax return he or she did not know of an omission
in the reported gross income, then after taking into account all the facts and
circumstances, the Internal Revenue Service can relieve that spouse of liability.
Commonality of action between family members is also not assumed in the
case of tax fraud. Section 6653(b) implies that in the case of tax fraud involv-
ing a joint return, the fraud must be established separately for each spouse. 28
The Supreme Court expressed its willingness to review longstanding as-
sumptions of commonality when, in Trammel v. United States,29 it re-ex-
amined the rule which allowed a privilege against adverse spousal testimony.
124 Metzger Trust, 76 TAx CT. REP. DEC. (P-H) 76.3 to 37a.
,22 Metzger Trust, 76 T.C. 42, 84 (1981), appeal filed Aug. 14, 1981.
122 See United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 357 (1957); Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co. v.
United States, 224 F. Supp. 391, 394 (E.D. Ark. 1963).
12 The obvious fourth, and perhaps best alternative, is legislative action to resolve the issue.
See Brogan, The Interaction Between Family Attribution Rules and Corporate Redemptions, 31
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 304 (1981), for recommendations.
128 In many instances courts have espoused a literal, non-yielding interpretation of the Code.
See, e.g., McWilliams v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 694 (1947), where the Court gave a strict interpretation
to § 267(b), (c) which provides for constructive ownership of stock in the context of § 267 disallow-
ances of deductions for losses, expenses, and interest from transactions between related
shareholders.
1'2 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
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The privilege was based on its role of fostering family harmony. But Chief
Justice Burger took a more realistic view, noting that "[w]hen one spouse is
willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding. . . there is proba-
bly little in the way of marital harmony for the privilege to preserve.
13
0
Rather than "frustrate justice" the Court chose to weigh reality heavier than
assumption.13 1
IX. SUMMARY
This note has traced the history of cases in which taxpayers have offered
bad blood as a factor to mitigate harsh effects sometimes attendant a literal,
mechanical approach to sections 302 and 318 of the Internal Revenue Code.
The better approach to the family hostility problem seems to be to continue to
recognize the effects of the rules governing attribution of stock. But that recog-
nition would be tempered with the realities of the factual setting. Section
302(b)(1) permits such a flexible approach. Of course, the best solution to the
problem would come from legislative clarification of congressional intent; until
that clarification appears, rights of judicial discretion must prevail.*
Joseph J. Miller
130 Id. at 52.
131 Id.
* Two developments, occuring as this article went to print, make the recognition of family
hostility as a mitigator of the sometimes harsh effects of the attribution rules in the context of
stock redemptions less likely. First, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 1982
Fed. Taxes (P-H) 1 59,552, overruled Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1979). See
supra note 100. The Act prohibited waivers by entities other than individuals through the addition
of the following new subparagraph to I.R.C. § 302(a):
(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR WAIVERS BY ENTITIES.-
(i) IN GENERAL.-Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to a distribution to any
entity unless-
(I) such entity and each related person meet the requirements of
clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) of subparagraph (A), and
(II) each related person agrees to be jointly and severally liable for any
deficiency (including interest and additions to tax) resulting from an acqui-
sition described in clause (ii) of subparagraph (A).
In any case to which the preceding sentence applies, the second sentence of sub-
paragraph (A) and subparagraph (B) (ii) shall be applied by substituting 'distribu-
tee or any related person' for 'distributee' each place it appears.
(ii) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this subparagraph-
(I) the term 'entity' means a partnership, estate, trust, or corporation;
and
(II) the term 'related person' means any person to whom ownership of
stock in the corporation is (at the time of the distribution) attributable
under section 318(a)(1) if such stock is further attributable to the entity
under section 318(a)(3).
Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 1982 FED. TAXES (P-H) % 59,552.
Second, the Tax Court's decision in Metzger was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d 459 (1982). The court found the reasoning in
Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975), unpersuasive and applied United States
v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), literally, holding that family hostility could not mitigate the stock
attribution rules. The determination of the issue, the court opined, "is not a task measured by the
chancellor's foot." 693 F.2d at 472. The court refused to look past what it considered to be the
1982]
19
Miller: The Bad Blood Factor and 302 Redemptions: A Retrospective Examina
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1982
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
plain language of the law in order to "do equity." Id.
The first and fifth circuits disagree. The matter is now ripe for Supreme Court clarification.
[Vol. 85
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